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TO PLEA OR NOT TO PLEA: THE BENEFITS OF
ESTABLISHING AN INSTITUTIONALIZED PLEA
BARGAINING SYSTEM IN JAPAN
Priyanka Prakash†
Abstract: Plea bargaining, the practice that permits the prosecution and defense to
negotiate reduced charges or a lighter sentence in exchange for the defendant’s guilty
plea, is a bedrock component of the criminal justice system in many nations. The
Japanese legal community, however, has resisted introducing plea bargaining into Japan’s
legal system. From 2001 to 2004, the Japanese legislature passed over twenty reform
laws to prepare the country’s criminal justice system for the demands of the twenty-first
century, but provisions for plea bargaining were conspicuously absent from the reform
package. This is largely because the Japanese legal community views plea bargaining as
antithetical to the Japanese justice system’s core values: obtaining the truth, encouraging
the defendant’s remorse and rehabilitation, and protecting victims’ interests. Resistance
to plea bargaining in Japan takes on heightened significance in light of increasing
pressures on the nation’s legal system to expedite criminal proceedings. Currently, there
are “tacit” informal types of plea bargaining that Japanese prosecutors use to simplify
trial procedures. This comment argues that tacit bargaining is an inadequate substitute
for formal institutionalized plea bargaining. While tacit bargaining may relieve burdens
on congested Japanese criminal courts, tacit bargains are unenforceable, leaving the
defendant without a remedy in the event the prosecution breaches the informal
agreement. The use of tacit bargaining is also concerning in regards to defendants’ rights
because it sustains coercive aspects of the Japanese justice system and leads to
uninformed, involuntary confessions. In order to address Japan’s cultural aversions to
plea bargaining, this comment examines the use of plea bargaining in international
criminal tribunals. These tribunals can serve as models for Japan because they have
demonstrated that plea bargaining can aid rather than undermine the goals of the Japanese
justice system.

I.

INTRODUCTION

“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an
essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered,
it is to be encouraged.”—Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the United
States Supreme Court.1

†

Juris Doctor expected in 2012, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Mary De Ming Fan and the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for
their guidance in developing this comment.
1
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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“[P]revailing legal sensibility recoil[s] at the thought that criminal
justice could be a matter to be negotiated rather than imposed.”—Mirjan
Damaška.2
Plea bargaining is simultaneously one of the most frequently used
practices in criminal justice systems around the globe and one of the most
controversial practices.3 At its core, plea bargaining is a negotiation process
between the prosecution and defense.4 It permits the defendant to admit
incriminating facts or to plead guilty to one or more criminal charges in
exchange for the prosecutor’s suspension of prosecution for other charges
(charge bargaining) or recommendation of a lighter sentence (sentence
bargaining). 5 The practice is voluntary; criminal defendants must choose
whether to waive their constitutional right to a jury trial and forgo the
safeguards that a trial provides. 6 On the one hand, plea bargaining is
considered vital for sustaining overburdened trial courts and prosecutorial
staffs.7 On the other hand, some believe that plea bargaining treats guilty
defendants too leniently and undermines the truth finding function of trial by
pressuring innocent defendants into accepting a bargain.8
The latter theory prevails in Japan, which lacks a formal plea
bargaining system and whose legal community has long resisted adoption of
such a system.9 Following a nationwide economic downturn in the 1990s,
the Japanese government instituted a series of legal reforms proposed by the
Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) to strengthen the foundations of
the country’s legal and administrative apparatuses for the twenty-first
century.10 The JSRC specifically refused to recommend a system of plea
2
Mirjan Damaška, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
1018, 1022 (2004).
3
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000).
4
Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals, 8 CHI.-KENT J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (2008).
5
Id.
6
See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260; Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Plea Bargaining, REGULATION,
Fall 2003, at 29, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n3/v26n3-8.pdf.
7
Fisher, supra note 3, at 867 (stating that plea bargaining “deliver[s] marvelously efficient relief
from a suffocating workload [for judges and prosecutors]”).
8
See Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx
County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987, 992, 999-1000 (1995).
9
See Jean Choi Desombre, Comparing the Notions of the Japanese and the U.S. Criminal Justice
System: An Examination of Pretrial Rights of the Criminally Accused in Japan and the United States, 14
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 103, 124 (1995) (observing that truth-seeking and accuracy are central goals of the
Japanese criminal justice system and that these goals would be undermined if innocent defendants pled
guilty).
10
See THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
REFORM COUNCIL FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY intro. (2001),
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bargaining, stating that it was important to develop efficient trial procedures
but that there were “problems” associated with giving criminal defendants
the choice to avoid trial.11 Accordingly, plea bargaining provisions were not
among the reform laws passed by the Japanese legislature.12 In addition,
Japanese legal professionals believe that plea bargaining is incompatible
with the pursuit of justice within the Japanse system,13 which emphasizes
truth seeking, the defendant’s remorse and rehabilitation, and the protection
of victims’ interests.14 The rejection of plea bargaining by the JSRC, the
Japanese legislature, and Japanese legal professionals assumes new urgency
in light of rising pressures on the country’s criminal justice system to
increase efficiency since the early 1990s.15
Despite their resistance to institutionalized plea bargaining, key
players in the Japanese legal system have sanctioned alternative kinds of
bargaining in response to the demand for efficiency.16 The main response
has been a system of “tacit” bargaining, in which there is an implicit, often
unspoken, exchange of the defendant’s confession for lesser charges or
recommendation of a more lenient sentence by the prosecutor. 17 When
defendants confess pursuant to a tacit bargain, they are usually convicted
under expedited trial procedures. 18 Since some semblance of trial is
preserved and prosecutors are not obligated to adhere to implicit bargains,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html
(citing
Law
Concerning
Establishment of the Justice System Reform Council, art. 2, para. 1); Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The
Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 36
(2006).
11
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 10, at ch. II, pt. 2 § (1)(6).
12
See Daniel H. Foote, Justice System Reform in Japan, at 11-13, http://www.reds.mshparis.fr/communication/docs/foote.pdf (listing the major reforms that the Japanese legislature made, of
which plea bargaining is not one).
13
See David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan 411, 416-17
(Jun. 7, 1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley) (on file with UMI
Dissertation Services).
14
See Desombre, supra note 9, at 124 (noting the truth-seeking component of the Japanese justice
system); Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Preserving Continental
Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 146-47 (2009) (noting the Japanese justice system’s commitment to the
goals of rehabilitation and remorse); Arne F. Soldwedel, Testing Japan’s Convictions: The Lay Judge
System and the Rights of Criminal Defendants, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1417, 1458-59 (2008) (noting
that, as crimes have increased, the Japanese justice system has become increasingly focused on protecting
victims’ rights rather than the rights of the accused).
15
See J. Sean Curtin, In Japan, the Crime Rate Also Rises, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, (Aug. 28, 2004),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FH28Dh01.html (describing rising crime rate in Japan) (last visited
April 25, 2011); JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME tbl. 2-3-1-1 (2006) [hereinafter
2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME], available at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/55/nfm/n_55_2_2_3_1_1.html
(showing decreasing number of trials in Japan since mid 1990s).
16
See JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 173-74 (Hiram E. Chodosh ed., 2009).
17
Id. at 192.
18
Id. at 184-91.
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tacit bargaining’s “unspoken exchange[s] of concessions” is more acceptable
to the Japanese legal community than institutionalized plea bargaining. 19
Nonetheless, some view tacit bargaining as the “functional analogue” of
formal, American-style plea bargaining.20
This comment argues that the confession-reliant tacit bargaining now
practiced in Japan is an ineffective substitute for a system of institutionalized
plea bargaining. Institutionalized plea bargaining achieves the ultimate
efficiency goal of avoiding trial in two ways: it creates binding, enforceable
bargains,21 and it yields benefits to both the defense and prosecution through
negotiation.22 In contrast, tacit bargains are nonnegotiable and nonbinding,23
and reinforce aspects of the Japanese justice system that favor prosecutorial
power. This is problematic in view of the Japanese government’s goal of
creating a more liberal justice system for the twenty-first century with
renewed focus on defendants’ rights.24 Furthermore, this comment argues
that, contrary to beliefs among Japanese legal professionals, institutionalized
plea bargaining would comport with the values of the Japanese justice
system that emphasize truth-seeking, the defendant’s remorse and
rehabilitation, and protection of victims’ interests.
In this regard,
international criminal tribunals can serve as models for Japan because they
utilize plea bargaining in ways that respect those objectives.
Part II of this comment describes the increasing burdens on the
Japanese criminal justice system and the tacit varieties of plea bargaining
that have developed in response. Part III argues that tacit bargaining cannot
substitute for a more formalized system of plea bargaining. Tacit bargaining
19

Id. at 191.
See Soldwedel, supra note 14, at 1434; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the
Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 57 (2001).
21
See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 773 (2001).
22
See Didrick Castberg, Prosecutorial Independence in Japan, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 38, 67-68
(1997) (noting that one feature of formal American-style plea bargaining is an offer and exchange of
specific benefits to both parties). Standard-form plea bargaining, in which a defendant’s guilty plea is
accompanied by standardized charge reductions or reductions in the prosecutor’s recommended length of
sentence, renders negotiation more of a theoretical possibility than the norm in many jurisdictions in the
United States. See, e.g., Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Comment, Apologies and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 311 (2007) (analogizing plea bargaining to an “assembly line model of
case processing in which prosecutors . . . assign a preliminary plea offer to each case”). However, the laws
of most jurisdictions leave the parties significant room for negotiation at the margins that take into account
the unique circumstances of each case. Id. at 312 (“Many plea agreements fall somewhere on the spectrum
that runs from supermarket bargaining to protracted bargaining.”).
23
TURNER, supra note 16, at 192.
24
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE JUSTICE REFORM pt. I(1)
(2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/991221_e.html (noting that JSRC is charged
with proposing reforms that recognize “plural viewpoints” of the justice system and that promote
“fundamental human rights”).
20
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exploits existing vulnerabilities in the Japanese justice system and often
leads to uninformed, involuntary confessions. The nonbinding,
nonnegotiable nature of tacit bargains also limits their effectiveness. In
contrast, a system of institutionalized plea bargaining would provide some
protection for defendants’ rights. It would also level the playing field
between the defense and prosecution by yielding enforceable plea
agreements through a negotiated exchange of benefits. Finally, Part IV
posits that international criminal tribunals can serve as exemplars for Japan
because they have used plea bargaining systematically and transparently in
ways that incorporate the goals of the Japanese justice system.
II.

INCREASING PRESSURE TO QUICKLY DISPOSE OF CRIMINAL CASES HAS
LED JAPANESE PROSECUTORS TO USE TACIT BARGAINING

Efficiency is the most often cited reason for the existence of plea
bargaining,25 and recent trends highlight the demand for efficiency in Japan.
Japan has been characterized as a “paradise lost” because of its once low
crime rates compared to other industrialized nations, followed by a gradual
increase in crime and decline in the public’s sense of security in the past two
decades.26 During the 1960s through the 1980s, when the crime rates of
most industrialized countries increased, Japan’s crime rate fell.27 However,
this pattern reversed during the 1990s and the first decade of this century, as
Japan experienced an economic downturn.28 Japan’s increasing crime rate
has translated into a decreasing number of cases tried and prosecuted in the
country, 29 signaling that the current system is in need of a safety valve.
Prosecutors have used tacit bargaining and the expedited trial procedures
that follow to address the burdens on the system, but tacit bargaining is not
an ideal solution to the problem of efficiency.

25
Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant: A Good Idea for Troubled Criminal
Justice Systems?, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 355, 392 (2010).
26
Dag Leonardsen, Crime in Japan: Paradise Lost?, 7 J. SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN CRIMINOLOGY &
CRIME PREVENTION 185, 185-86 (2006).
27
See Curtin, supra note 15.
28
Id.; see also Leonardsen, supra note 26, at 185 (concluding that the 1990s economic slump
explains the rise in crime in Japan).
29
See 2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 15, at tbl. 2-3-1-1.
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Japan Is Experiencing an Upswing in Crime Rates and a Shortage of
Prosecutorial Resources

The increase in crime in Japan from the 1990s to the present has been
significant. One writer places the increase in the overall crime rate from
1994 to 2004 at approximately 150%.30 The Japanese Ministry of Justice
issued a White Paper on Crime in 2002 that showed a steady increase in the
number of reported crimes since 1990. 31 There was an accompanying
decrease in the clearance rate, the rate at which suspects are released from
police custody or cleared of charges, for alleged violations of the Japanese
Penal Code.32 Although recently issued White Papers indicate a decline in
crime since 2003, crime is still high by historical standards 33 and not all
types of crime have decreased in frequency. 34 Specifically, less serious
nonviolent crimes, such as car thefts and burglaries, have seen the greatest
rate increases in the past two decades.35 The increase in crime in Japan,
particularly less serious crime, supports the argument in favor of plea
bargaining because prosecutors are under pressure to dispose of each case
quickly and turn their attention to other crimes.36 Less serious crimes are
particularly amenable to plea bargaining because prosecutors may consider
the seriousness of an offense and public response to a plea bargain when
deciding whether to enter into plea discussions.37
Although Japan’s rising crime rate and decreasing clearance rate
demand more prosecutorial resources to keep the public safe, prosecutors’
offices remain “[c]hronically understaffed.”38 In 2006, according to United
Nations estimates, there were fewer than two prosecutors in Japan for every

30

Curtin, supra note 15. But see David T. Johnson, Crime and Punishment in Contemporary Japan,
36 CRIME & JUST. 371, 376-78 (2007) (arguing that the perception of a rise in crime has been fueled by
changes in police crime reporting practices).
31
JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME fig. 1-1-1-6 (2002), available at
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/47/nfm/n_47_2_1_1_1_2.html (click link to “preface” in the index to see
summary of report or click on links to individual sections).
32
Id. at fig. 1-1-1-1.
33
See Leonardsen, supra note 26; 2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 15, at pt. 1, ch. 1, § 1.1.
34
Japan’s Crime Rate Soars, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/1472175.stm.
35
Id.
36
See TURNER, supra note 16, at 174.
37
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 131 (1997) (asserting that less serious and less visible crimes are most amenable to
plea bargaining because prosecutors can avoid the public perception that they are being soft on crime by
making a plea agreement).
38
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 20, at 54.
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100,000 people. 39 Although the Japanese government plans to bring the
number of lawyers nationwide up to at least 50,000 by 2018 with changes to
bar admission rules made in 2002,40 the number of attorneys will remain low
by international standards.41 Moreover, there is no guarantee that a sizable
share of the new lawyers will choose to work as criminal lawyers when more
attractive career paths are available.42 In addition to the small number of
prosecutors, the number of trials has decreased quite steadily from 1996 to
2005. 43 The fact that the number of trials cannot keep pace with the
country’s crime rate shows that prosecutors need the kind of safety valve
provided by plea bargaining. The Japanese legislature’s introduction of a
jury requirement for serious criminal cases beginning in 2009 has placed
further limits on prosecutorial resources. 44 The jury trial requirement
impacts roughly 3% of criminal cases each year and is a reality that
prosecutors must confront by conserving resources whenever possible.45
The public mood in Japan is not impervious to the nation’s increasing
crime rate. The sense of security that Japanese citizens once felt has
gradually eroded, to the point that people fear for their personal safety. 46
The fear signals that “something new is happening in a society renowned for
its peacefulness and high level of social integration.” 47 The public is
distrustful of the ability of government authorities to clamp down on
increasing crime rates.48 Perhaps these trends in the public mood indicate
39
U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Questionnaire for the Tenth U.N. Survey of Crime Trends and
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 2005-2006, at 956,
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/All_countries.pdf (listing 1.95 prosecutors in Japan per
100,000 people).
40
Reforms in Japan Expected to Bring Influx of Lawyers, Lawsuits, INSURANCE JOURNAL (Aug. 21,
2006), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2006/08/21/71561.htm (last visited April 25,
2011); Number of Lawyers in Japan to Top 30,000 Soon, JAPAN TODAY, Dec. 22, 2010.
41
The United States had more than four times as many prosecutors as Japan (8.84) for every 100,000
people in 2005, while still using plea bargaining on a regular basis to keep the court system running
efficiently. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, supra note 39, at 2290.
42
Reforms in Japan Expected to Bring Influx of Lawyers, Lawsuits, supra note 40 (remarking that
“[d]efense lawyers are widely perceived as protectors of the public’s enemies and are often poorly paid”).
43
See 2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 15, at tbl. 2-3-1-1(tracking a relatively steady
decline from 1996 to 2005 in the number of defendants that are finally judged by trials).
44
See Matthew J. Wilson, U.S. Legal Education Methods and Ideals: Application to the Japanese
and Korean Systems, 18 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 295, 334 (2010) (explaining that Japanese courts
had to appoint defense attorneys in 6730 cases that were filed in the month following implementation of the
new jury trial system).
45
Matthew Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan: Success on the Horizon?, 24 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 835, 844-45 (2007) (listing types of cases in which new mixed jury system is required and
calculating that 3.2% of cases would have been subject to the requirement in 2005).
46
See Leonardsen, supra note 26, at 186 (describing fear that Japanese parents and teachers have
about youth and a rising preoccupation with media coverage of crime).
47
Id. at 187.
48
See Curtin, supra note 15 (finding that public confidence in the police has hit a record low).
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that the Japanese citizenry is ready for the government to try more efficient
methods of prosecuting crime and getting criminals off the streets. Indeed,
one of the findings of the JSRC was that the public doubted the
government’s ability to quickly try and sentence criminal defendants.49 Plea
bargaining could be an effective tool in the government’s arsenal for
achieving speedier criminal justice.
B.

Japanese Prosecutors Have Used Tacit Bargaining in Response to the
Pressures to Expedite Criminal Proceedings

The trends noted above illustrate that efficiency is now a core concern
of the Japanese criminal justice system, creating the need for a system of
plea bargaining. Japanese prosecutors, encouraged by trial courts, have
responded to the demand for efficiency by using various forms of informal
tacit bargaining.50 In her survey of plea bargaining systems across the globe,
Jenia Turner identifies three types of tacit bargaining that are used in Japan:
1) an informal offer of summary prosecution and a monetary fine rather than
a custodial sentence, in exchange for a confession; 2) an informal offer of
suspended prosecution or recommendation of a lenient sentence, in
exchange for a confession; and 3) an unspoken exchange of a lighter
sentence for confession and cooperation with the court.51
Summary prosecution, in which no formal trial occurs, is the primary
mode of resolution used in minor criminal cases and traffic offenses.52 More
serious cases, however, must be resolved by a full-scale trial or by the
expedited trials allowed by the second and third type of tacit bargains.53 All
three categories of tacit bargaining identified by Turner rest on the
defendant’s confession.54 The implicit bargain (i.e. the promise of a more
lenient sentence or of suspended prosecution) is offered in exchange for the
defendant’s confession, and this exchange of benefits occurs during pretrial
interrogation before the defendant is formally charged and pleads in court.55
As one writer explains,
In Japan, there is no guilty plea as such, as the accused can only
admit or deny the facts as set forth in the indictment. And by
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 10, at ch. II, pt. 2, § 1.
TURNER, supra note 16, at 174, 191.
Id. at 189, 191.
See 2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 15, at tbl. 2-3-1-3; Johnson, supra note 13, at 414.
TURNER, supra note 16, at 191.
Id.
Id.
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the time the indictment is filed, the defendant has generally
given a statement in which he or she confesses or admits to
most of the facts charged. Thus the defendant in Japan has little
with which to bargain.56
In contrast, in the Anglo-American system, the bargain is offered in
exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea, and the terms of the bargain are
reduced to writing before the defendant appears in court. The system of
confession-dependent tacit bargaining and the system of plea-dependent
institutionalized bargaining differ in important respects.
C.

Japanese Prosecutors Rely on Tacit Bargaining Because of Cultural
Aversion to Institutionalized Plea Bargaining

Tacit bargaining can be viewed as a way of getting around the
ingrained cultural aversion to “explicit” plea bargaining within the Japanese
legal community.57 Japan’s cultural distaste for plea bargaining stems from
the fact that the country’s justice system is not centered on defendants’
rights, or what some scholars call “procedural justice.”58 Rather, it focuses
on achieving the “just result,” or what some scholars call “substantive
justice.”59 There are three goals of the Japanese justice system that lead the
way to the “just result”: seeking a truthful account of events, exacting
remorse from defendants while attempting to rehabilitate them, and
protecting victims.60 Many Japanese legal professionals believe that plea
bargaining interferes with these goals because “the advance promise of
leniency” pressures innocent defendants to plead guilty and induces guilty
defendants to distort the truth.61 They believe that the pressure to falsify
undermines the search for truth. 62 They also believe that, whereas a
confession reveals the motives behind a defendant’s crime, a guilty plea
precludes a sincere apology from the defendant, diminishes the prospects for
genuine rehabilitation, and interferes with the victim’s healing process.63
56

Castberg, supra note 22, at 68.
See TURNER, supra note 16, at 191, 195.
58
Desombre, supra note 9, at 103; Soldwedel, supra note 14, at 1430.
59
Id.
60
See Desombre, supra note 9, at 124 (noting the truth-seeking component of the Japanese justice
system); Weber, supra note 14, at 146-47 (noting the Japanese justice system’s commitment to the goals of
rehabilitation and remorse); Soldwedel, supra note 14, at 1458-59 (noting that, as crimes have increased,
the Japanese justice system has become increasingly focused on protecting victims’ rights rather than the
rights of the accused).
61
Desombre, supra note 9, at 124.
62
Id.
63
Weber, supra note 14, at 146-47.
57

616

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 3

To get around cultural obstacles to institutionalized plea bargaining,
Japanese legal professionals use tacit bargaining. However, tacit bargaining
is concerning in regards to defendants’ rights, as covered in Part III. The use
of plea bargaining in international criminal tribunals, as covered in Part IV,
indicates that institutionalized plea bargaining may actually be a better fit for
the values of the Japanese justice system.
III.

THE NONBINDING, COERCIVE NATURE OF TACIT BARGAINS MAKE THEM
INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTES FOR FORMAL PLEA AGREEMENTS

Formal institutionalized plea bargaining has been the object of much
criticism,64 raising the question of whether Japan would be better served by
continuing to use the tacit bargaining system that preserves at least some
semblance of trial procedures. 65 There is voluminous literature that
criticizes the quality of justice that results from institutionalized plea
bargaining. 66 A common thread in this literature is that plea bargaining
subverts the integrity of the judicial system because the defendant gives up
the safeguards of trial, such as judicial neutrality and the public forum.67
Plea bargaining is also criticized for its coerciveness; it pressures defendants
into waiving their right to a trial and punishes defendants who insist on trial
with harsher sentences. 68 Finally, some believe that plea bargaining
pressures innocent defendants who don’t want to accept the risks associated
with trial into pleading guilty, thereby undermining the truth finding function
of trial.69 The main response to these arguments usually hinges on the sheer
necessity of plea bargaining in overburdened criminal justice systems. 70
64
See Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International
Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 n.13 (2002) (listing several articles that are critical of plea bargaining).
65
Summary prosecution, often used to resolve minor crimes, avoids trial, but the types of tacit
bargaining generally used to resolve more serious cases preserve an expedited form of trial. See TURNER,
supra note 16, at 191; Johnson, supra note 13, at 414.
66
See generally Combs, supra note 64.
67
See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (1983); Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-CriminalLaw Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1361, 1368-69 (2003).
68
See, e.g., Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 26 REGULATION 24, 27 (2003),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n3/v26n3-7.pdf; Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 363 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Desombre, supra note 9, at 119.
69
See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining? The Core
Concerns of Plea Bargaining’s Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 768 (1998); Michael W. Smith, Making the
Innocent Guilty: Plea Bargaining and the False Plea Convictions of the Innocent, 46(5) CRIM. LAW
BULLETIN ART 4, 14 (2010).
70
See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times
the number of judges and court facilities.”).
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Plea bargaining is viewed as an essential time saver71 because it shortcuts
complicated trial procedures while still affording defendants some measure
of choice in deciding whether to “‘sell’ [their] right to trial.”72
The increasing crime rates and shortage of prosecutorial resources in
Japan highlight the necessity for a plea bargaining system in the country.73
Thus, while it is beyond the scope of this comment to embark on an in-depth
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of plea bargaining, this
comment does adopt the stance that plea bargaining, for all its flaws, is a
valuable feature in overburdened court systems. Furthermore, this comment
argues that, compared to institutionalized plea bargaining, the problems
associated with tacit plea bargaining are more numerous and more restrictive
of defendants’ rights.
At about the same time that crime started increasing in Japan in the
1990s, the country’s legal system also began undergoing a major transition,
formally shifting from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system. 74
Many of the reform laws passed by the Japanese legislature following the
JSRC recommendations were intended to introduce an adversarial
component into Japan’s criminal justice system.75 However, vestiges of the
old inquisitorial system remain.76 The principle aim of the Japanese justice
system is still “to achieve the just result, not the just process,” so that “if the
accused is indeed guilty, the Japanese system is driven to find him guilty
even if his rights are violated in the process of determining his guilt.”77 Tacit
plea bargaining, which rests on obtaining confessions, reinforces coercive
institutional structures and relationships within the Japanese system in a way
that is concerning for the rights of criminal defendants. Institutionalized
plea bargaining would result in fewer uninformed, involuntary confessions
in Japan. A system of formal plea agreements would also introduce more
balance into Japan’s criminal justice process and into the relationships of key
players in the Japanese legal system. It would do so by fostering binding

71

Fisher, supra note 3, at 1070.
Sandefur, supra note 6.
73
See supra Part II.
74
Tom Ginsburg, Review: Untitled, 30 J. JAPANESE STUD. 572, 573 (2004) (reviewing THE
JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS (Malcolm M. Feeley &
Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002)).
75
See Foote, supra note 12, at 11-12 (describing reform laws, such as the strengthening of public
defender agencies and introduction of ADR mechanisms, that have attempted to equalize the power of the
defense and prosecution).
76
See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 573 (noting that many authors have concluded that Japan has not
met its stated objective of fully transitioning to an adversarial system).
77
Desombre, supra note 9, at 103.
72
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plea agreements through a negotiated exchange of benefits and setting up
structures that are protective of defendants’ rights.
A.

Tacit Bargaining Depends on Confessions Obtained Under Coercive
Conditions Where the Defendant’s Access to Counsel Is Restricted

Despite Japan’s transition to a primarily adversarial legal system, the
balance of power is still skewed in the prosecution’s favor, particularly
during the pretrial stage. Prosecutors focus on obtaining confessions prior to
trial, 78 and tacit bargaining relies on the defendant’s confession.
Accordingly, the practice of tacit bargaining exploits the coercive conditions
that exist at the pretrial stage due to the lack of procedural safeguards in the
Japanese justice system. Confessions are considered to be the “‘king of
evidence’”79 and form the basis for a conviction in over 90% of criminal
cases in Japan,80 so the connection between tacit bargaining and coercive
institutional structures raises concern in many cases. American-style
institutionalized plea bargaining can help equalize the power of the defense
and prosecution by affording defendants greater institutional safeguards
when they decide whether to accept a plea agreement.
1.

Confessions Are Often Obtained in Japan Under Coercive Conditions

Coercive interrogation practices are linked to the high frequency of
confessions in Japan.81 There is a 93% confession rate82 and a conviction
rate over 99% in Japan.83 In addition to virtually ensuring conviction at trial,
confessions are viewed as “a first step on the road to rehabilitation,”84 an
important goal of the country’s justice system. In fact, confession takes
precedence in criminal prosecutions over other important factual and legal
issues that should be examined to preserve the presumption of innocence,
78

Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency,
More Access, and More Time, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487, 504-05 (2010).
79
Norimitsu Onishi, Pressed by Police, Even Innocent Confess in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007,
at A1 (quoting Japanese attorney and former judge Kenzo Akiyama).
80
Wilson, supra note 78, at 508-09.
81
Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 574 (acknowledging that “the frequency of confession is no doubt tied
to interrogation practices”).
82
See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 20, at 57.
83
Wilson, supra note 78, at 508. Note that the confession and conviction rates can differ because the
Japanese Constitution requires independent evidentiary corroboration of a defendant’s confession in order
to convict. See KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 38, para. 3 (Japan).
84
Erik D. Herber, Japanese Sentencing Practices: Creating an Opportunity for Formal
“Paternalism,” 2 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOC. THEORY 303, 306 (2009), available at
http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/ijcst/article/viewFile/23406/21602.
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such as analysis of forensic evidence. 85 In light of the importance of
confession to the legal system, there is a great deal of pressure on police and
prosecutors to obtain confessions from defendants. 86 While there are
analogous pressures to obtain guilty pleas in the Anglo-American system,
the pressures used to secure confessions are more acute in Japan for two
reasons. First, Japanese prosecutors have greater discretion than their
American counterparts during the pretrial interrogation period.87 Second, a
defendant’s access to counsel is restricted during the pretrial period in Japan,
making interrogation a more isolating, coercive experience in Japan than in
the American system.88
Japanese police and prosecutors employ a variety of methods to
extract confessions within the coercive interrogation environment.89 Once
arrested, defendants can be held in police custody for up to twenty-three
days and questioned during that period before they are indicted. 90 This
period can be extended with court approval when the suspect faces charges
for multiple crimes, 91 which is often true in cases that are amenable to
bargaining.92 Article 198(1) of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure
places suspects under a duty to appear at interrogation, 93 and although
suspects may refuse to answer questions, they cannot cut off questioning and
are therefore susceptible to coercive interrogation techniques.94 Authorities
may resort to threats or psychological torture to extract a confession from an
85
Stephan Landsman & Jing Zhang, A Tale of Two Juries: Lay Participation Comes to Japanese
and Chinese Courts, 25 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 179, 184 (2008).
86
See John O. Haley, A Spiral of Success: Community Support is Key to Restorative Justice in
Japan, 38 ECOLOGY JUST. 2, 2 (1994), available at http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC38/Haley.htm.
87
Id. (noting that “discretionary powers . . . make official restorative measures possible.”).
88
See Wilson, supra note 78, at 505; but see JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, JAPAN FEDERATION OF
BAR ASSOCIATIONS UPDATE REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE LIST OF ISSUES TO BE TAKEN UP IN CONNECTION
WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE FIFTH PERIODIC REPORT OF JAPAN 11 (2008), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/JFBA_Japan94.pdf [hereinafter “JAPAN FED’N OF BAR
ASS’NS”]; JAPAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL SUPPORT BY THE
JAPAN LEGAL SUPPORT CENTER (2006), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/issues02.html
(describing 2004 Comprehensive Legal Support Law that has expanded pre-trial access to counsel for
defendants in some types of criminal cases since 2006) .
89
Wilson, supra note 78, at 509.
90
Robert M. Bloom, Jury Trials in Japan 27 (Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, Working
Paper
No.
41,
2005),
available
at
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=lsfp.
91
Wilson, supra note 78, at 504 n.116.
92
Craig Albee, Note, Multiple Punishment in Wisconsin and the Wolske Decision: Is it Desirable to
Permit Two Homicide Convictions For Causing a Single Death?, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 553, 572 (1990)
(noting that “a defendant facing the prospect of conviction on a number of charges is more likely to be
compelled to plead guilty for plea bargaining purposes, regardless of his actual guilt”).
93
See KEISOHŌ [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 198, para. 1 (Japan).
94
See Desombre, supra note 9, at 109-10.
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uncooperative defendant. 95 Such abuses occur despite constitutional
prohibitions against compelled testimony.96 In the infamous 1991 wrongful
conviction case of Toshikazu Sugaya, who was charged with kidnapping and
murdering a four-year-old girl but ultimately acquitted after spending
seventeen years in jail, interrogators questioned Sugaya for thirteen
consecutive hours without access to counsel.97 The public rarely learns of
such interrogation abuses because interrogations occur incommunicado; they
are not fully recorded, and prosecutors sometimes cherry pick which
portions of recordings to make available to the court.98
While the American system is not immune from these kinds of abuses,
the kind of institutionalized plea bargaining that is prevalent in America
could reduce the coerciveness of Japan’s pretrial processes. Japanese
authorities implicitly recognize this, citing the lack of a formal plea
bargaining as a justification for their use of harsh interrogation methods.99
Because plea bargaining, unlike most forms of tacit bargaining, eliminates
the trial stage, the main event of the criminal justice process in a plea
bargaining system is the process of pretrial plea negotiations.100 Both parties
bring all their bargaining chips to the plea discussions and must abide by the
plea agreement that is reached; as discussed in greater detail below, the
defendant can withdraw a guilty plea if the prosecutor reneges on the deal.101
The binding nature of the plea agreement gives the prosecutor incentive to
engage defense counsel at each step of the negotiations and develop a
mutually amicable agreement. This kind of negotiating environment
facilitates “openness and candor” 102 between the parties during the
bargaining process. It can permit more transparent negotiations and yield
fairer deals that will withstand the test of time.
In contrast, in Japan’s tacit bargaining system, prosecutors often do
not deal with defense counsel prior to trial. Rather, they interrogate the
unrepresented defendant alone, setting up a one-sided situation where
prosecutors are prone to use coercive techniques to secure confessions. One
of these techniques may be to offer a tacit bargain but leave little or no room
95

Wilson, supra note 78, at 509.
KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 38, para. 2 (Japan).
See Martin Fackler, Falsely Convicted, Freed and No Longer Quiet, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010.
98
See Prosecutors to Partially Record Interrogations, JAPAN TODAY, Dec. 8, 2010,
http://www.japantoday.com/category/crime/view/prosecutors-to-partially-record-interrogations (last visited
April 27, 2011).
99
Wilson, supra note 78, at 509.
100
Adam Robison, Comment, Waiver of Plea Agreement Statements: A Glimmer of Hope to Limit
Plea Statement Usage to Impeachment, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 671 (2005).
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Damaška, supra note 2, at 1027.
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for negotiation or modifications to the initial offer. With the full force of the
prosecutorial system bearing down upon them, Japanese defendants may
confess because they feel like they have “little with which to bargain.”103
The lack of access to defense counsel for many Japanese defendants means
that there is no one to counterbalance the prosecutor’s apparent power
during the tacit bargaining stage. In sum, in contrast to their American
counterparts, Japanese prosecutors in the tacit bargaining system work
within an isolating, coercive environment where defendants are likely to
confess even if doing so is against their best interests.
2.

Access to Counsel Prior to Confession Is Restricted in the Japanese
Justice System

In Japan, parties usually agree to tacit bargains during interrogation
without the presence of defense counsel.104 In most cases, the exchange of
the tacit bargain for the defendant’s confession occurs prior to pleading
guilty or not guilty. 105 When defendants gain access to counsel after
indictment, they may recant their confessions and plead not guilty, but this
does not prevent the courts from using the original confession as
incriminating evidence. 106 Thus, tacit bargains, once struck during the
interrogation period, can do real damage to a defendant’s case, and it is
important for a defendant to consult with counsel before confessing. Until
recent amendments to Japan’s Criminal Procedure Code in 2004,107 a suspect
had no right to request the presence of an attorney during the pre-indictment
interrogation period or to stop the interrogation midway to consult with an
attorney.108
In 2004, the Japanese legislature amended the Code of Criminal
Procedure to provide access to state-appointed counsel for indigent
defendants before indictment.109 The amendment went into effect in two
phases.110 In the first phase, effective in October 2006, the new system of
state-appointed counsel was extended to cases that are punishable by death
103

Castberg, supra note 22.
See Wilson, supra note 78, at 505 (noting that traditionally, state-appointed counsel has been
unavailable to defendants until after indictment).
105
TURNER, supra note 16, at 192.
106
See Wilson, supra note 78, at 500 (explaining that Toshikazu Sugaya, in his 1991 murder trial,
recanted his confession after gaining access to counsel because the confession was given under the duress,
but the trial court proceeded to convict him based on his confession).
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See JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 88; KEISOHŌ [C. CRIM. PRO.] arts. 32, 36 (Japan).
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Wilson, supra note 78, at 505.
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See JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 88; KEISOHŌ [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 32 (Japan).
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JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 88.
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or by life imprisonment or a minimum term of not less than one year.111 In
2009, the system was extended also to any crimes that have a maximum
term of more than three years.112
Yet, even these amendments do not ensure that every defendant has
access to counsel prior to confession. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs claims that the system covers 80% of criminal cases.113 This leaves
out the other 20% of cases, which are usually minor crimes that may be most
amenable to plea bargaining.114 Accordingly, the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations (JFBA) has declared that the new system is “far from
international standards.” 115 Despite the 2004 amendment, under Article
39(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor still retains
discretion to determine the time, duration, and location of suspect-counsel
meetings prior to indictment. 116 These restrictions on the availability of
counsel set up a situation where the defendant may not fully appreciate the
benefits and drawbacks of confession or of accepting a tacit offer of leniency
from the prosecutor.
Because the Japanese Constitution, like the United States
Constitution, guarantees criminal defendants the right to a trial,117 a formal
waiver of this constitutional right through plea bargaining would likely
require special safeguards, particularly the right to counsel. In Japan, with
the exception of traffic infractions and other minor offenses, trial is
preserved when the defendant confesses to a crime pursuant to a tacit
bargain. 118 In the American system, when a defendant chooses to plead
guilty and forego a trial, the defendant’s rights are protected by a plea
colloquy or hearing.119 The United States Supreme Court has explained that
“[t]he purpose of a plea colloquy is to protect the defendant from an
unintelligent or involuntary plea.”120 During a colloquy, the trial court must
explain to defendants that they have the right to a jury trial and the right
against self-incrimination at the trial and are foregoing those rights by

111
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pleading guilty.121 Defendants have the right to be represented by counsel
during the plea hearing. 122 Thus, even for defendants who make
incriminating statements during pretrial interrogation, the plea colloquy
gives those defendants a second chance to weigh their options and decide
whether to plead guilty after consulation with counsel.
There is no analogue to the plea colloquy in the Japanese system since
defendants charged with serious crimes must go through the motions of a
trial even after confessing pursuant to a tacit bargain.123 If Japan were to
adopt a system of institutionalized plea bargaining, in which bargaining
shortcuts the trial stage of a case, it is likely that some analogue to the plea
colloquy would be necessary to formalize and regularize guilty pleas.
Accordingly, Japanese defendants would have access to counsel at their plea
hearing before waiving the right to trial. In turn, increased access to defense
counsel in Japan’s criminal justice system would result in fewer involuntary
and uninformed admissions of guilt as a basis of conviction.
B.

Tacit Bargaining Reinforces Close Judge-Prosecutor Relationships
and a Deferential Culture Among Defense Attorneys in Japan

Part I of this comment described the relatively small number of
lawyers in Japan compared to the United States.124 The small size of the
Japanese bar and the country’s rising crime rates highlight the need for plea
bargaining as a tool of efficiency.125 More important than the number of
attorneys in Japan, however, are the relationships among legal professionals.
These relationships suggest that institutionalized plea bargaining is a better
fit for Japan than tacit plea bargaining.
Because of prosecutorial privileges before and during trial, there
exists a deferential and cooperative culture among Japanese defense
attorneys.126 Before trial, defense lawyers often do not even recommend that
their clients exercise their right to silence.127 In spite of the new system of
state-appointed counsel prior to indictment, defense attorneys are already
accustomed to deferring to the investigative practices of police and

121
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Id. at 323.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
Johnson, supra note 13, at 414 (distinguishing between contested and uncontested forms of trial in
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prosecutors. 128 Because of their traditional deferential relationship with
prosecutors, defense attorneys often advise their clients to confess.129 The
fact that tacit bargains are nonnegotiable and unenforceable reinforces this
deferential culture because the defense has little power at the bargaining
table and may see no other choice but to accept the prosecutor’s offer.
During trial, the prosecution retains its advantage because any
evidence obtained during interrogation, including a confession, becomes part
of the dossier that is presented to the trial court.130 A dossier is a written
account of the evidence drafted by the prosecutor.131 A dossier is not an
objective account of the evidence but a summary of the evidence obtained
during pretrial investigation written from the prosecutor’s perspective.
Nonetheless, judges are quick to use the dossier both in evaluating the
defendant’s guilt and in sentencing.132 Defense attorneys rarely object to
dossier evidence at trial because reliance on the dossier is a “custom based
on years of tradition.” 133 Courts have come to depend so much on the
dossier that one former judge had this to say:
[I]n their current state, criminal trials—and in particular the
fact-finding that lies at the heart of trials—are conducted in
closed rooms by the investigators, and the proceedings in open
court are merely a formal ceremony. In a word, [reliance on the
dossier] is the turning of public trials into an empty shell.134
The reliance on the dossier stems from the deep relationship of trust between
the judge and the prosecutor, a vestige of the old inquisitorial system. 135
Although the introduction of jury trials since 2009 has reduced reliance on
dossier evidence, 136 the jury requirement does not extend to the large
majority of cases. 137 Moreover, the introduction of jury trials does not
impact pretrial interrogation practices. Ultimately, therefore, defense
attorneys and their clients occupy a weaker position relative to the
128
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prosecution. Institutionalized plea bargaining could introduce more balance
between the parties by yielding a negotiated exchange of benefits and
binding, enforceable plea agreements. In such a system, defense attorneys
would form one-half of the negotiation process, on an equal ground with the
other half, the prosecutor. Emphasizing the importance of defense counsel
to the plea bargaining process, a former American judge has called the
defense attorney the “‘equalizer’ in the bargaining process.”138 In a system
of formal plea agreements, defense attorneys would need to take
responsibility for the bargains that will determine the evolution of their
clients’ cases.
1.

Tacit Bargains Lack Formal Enforcement Mechanisms If the
Prosecutor Breaches and Are Not Formed by a Negotiated Exchange
of Benefits

The usefulness of tacit bargains for relieving burdens on Japan’s court
system is diminished by the fact that such bargains are nonbinding and
unenforceable if the prosecutor breaches the agreement.
Japanese
prosecutors may suspend prosecution on a particular charge, may
recommend a lenient sentence, and may do something else that is the subject
of an implicit bargain, but they need not do so.139 The tacit agreement does
not appear on the record. 140 This leaves the defendant without a legal
remedy if the prosecutor reneges on the implicit deal. 141 In contrast, a
formal plea bargain is a written agreement signed by both parties and is
enforceable as a contract once approved by the court.142
The written record of the plea agreement is useful if the prosecutor
reneges on the deal, prompting the defendant to seek enforcement of the
agreement. 143 American courts apply principles of contract law to the

138
Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1179
(1975) (quoting Judge J. Skelly Wright in The New Role of Defense Counsel Under Escobedo and Miranda,
52 A.B.A. J. 1117, 1120 (1966)).
139
TURNER, supra note 16, at 191-92.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 192.
142
See United States v. A-Abras Inc., 185 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the parties used a
written plea agreement); United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “plea
agreements are typically construed according to the principles of contract law”); Pannarale v. State, 638
N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994) (noting that pleas are “contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the state
and the trial court”).
143
Colquitt, supra note 21, at 747 (stating that a written plea agreement is useful in the event of an
appeal or other type of collateral proceeding).
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enforcement of plea agreements.144 For example, in an appropriate case, the
defendant may be entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement.145
Conversely, prosecutors in Japan are keenly aware that they can change their
minds about tacit bargains. 146 While it is true that prosecutors normally
abide by the terms of tacit agreements to encourage other defendants to
confess in the future,147 the lack of a record and enforcement remedies leave
the prosecutor with discretion as to whether to honor the agreement. This
creates a scenario that is very different from formal plea bargaining:
“defendants are not bargaining—instead, they are essentially throwing
themselves at the mercy of the authorities, who ultimately decide whether to
honor [the] ‘deal.’” 148 Even though prosecutors in the Japanese system
usually honor informal deals because of the impact of repudiation on future
cases, individual defendants may hesitate to confess and enter into implicit
deals in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms. This could lead to
fewer tacit agreements, undermining the ultimate goal of bargaining, which
is to reduce burdens on trial courts.
The prosecutor’s ability to renege on an informal deal makes the terms
and finality of the deal less predictable than is the case with institutionalized
plea bargaining. Tacit bargains benefit the prosecution by triggering less
time-consuming court proceedings, and they benefit the defendant by saving
time, litigation costs, and perhaps a harsher sentence or heightened
charges. 149 Japanese prosecutors, however, have less flexibility in
negotiating tacit bargains than their counterparts in a formal plea bargaining
system. For example, they usually cannot offer the defendant more than predetermined, standard sentence reductions as a “reward” for confession.150 In
contrast, prosecutors engaged in formal plea bargaining can generally
consider all of the mitigating circumstances of a case and develop an

144
See id. at 772; United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “plea
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and the trial court”).
145
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148
See TURNER, supra note 16, at 192.
149
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appropriate deal.151 Thus, tacit bargaining is not a negotiation similar to the
kind that occurs in American-style plea bargaining, where the prosecutor
comes to the bargaining table with flexibility and a range of benefits to
offer.152 The benefits afforded by tacit plea bargaining are much narrower
and less predictable.
IV.

THE USE OF FORMAL PLEA BARGAINING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS ADDRESSES JAPAN’S CULTURAL AVERSION TO PLEA
BARGAINING

In spite of the tacit negotiations that are common within the Japanese
criminal justice system, there is an enduring cultural distaste for plea
bargaining among Japanese legal professionals, so much so that the practice
is referred to as “evil.”153 Therefore, any argument that Japan should adopt a
system of institutionalized plea bargaining must address the deep-rooted
cultural aversion to the practice. As discussed above, many Japanese legal
professionals believe that plea bargaining is incompatible with the central
values of the Japanese justice system: seeking the truth, ensuring the
defendant’s remorse and rehabilitation, and protecting victims’ interests.
The use of plea bargaining in international criminal tribunals is important in
this regard because these tribunals share the goals of the Japanese justice
system and have used plea bargaining in ways that respect these goals.
International criminal tribunals have reconciled competing cultural
viewpoints on plea bargaining and pragmatically opted for an open,
systematic use of the practice in order to manage increasing case loads and
complex cases. 154 The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) are
among the international tribunals that permit plea bargaining.155 The use of
plea bargaining in international tribunals is particularly controversial
because of the serious nature of the crimes involved, the duty of
international courts to prosecute these crimes and issue proportionate
151
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consider when deciding whether to engage in plea discussions); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.077(8)(b)
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of plea agreements); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (stating broadly that prosecutor and defense counsel “may
discuss and reach a plea agreement”).
152
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153
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sentences, and the need to create a sufficient historical record of cases for
posterity.156 Because of the unique functions of international courts and the
serious nature of international crimes, the goals that are central to the
Japanese justice system are also central to international courts. 157
International tribunals have managed to reconcile plea bargaining with the
important objectives of truth seeking, the defendant’s remorse and
rehabilitation, and victim protection.
A.

International Tribunals Have Used Procedural Rules to Reconcile
Plea Bargaining and the Pursuit of Truth

As with Japanese courts, truth seeking is a priority of international
criminal tribunals because of the tribunals’ duty to develop an accurate
historical record of cases for the future and see to it that “less information is
lost in the catacombs of the past.”158 Full-blown trials yield a record of the
facts of a case through evidentiary production and witness testimony, and
there is concern that plea bargaining hinders the truth-finding function by
shortcutting this process.159 The ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Plavšić, relating
to the conflict in Bosnia during the 1990s, is one of the first international
plea-bargained cases and provides an example of how plea bargaining may
actually aid the truth-finding function of courts.160
The defendant in that case, Biljana Plavšić, was the president of
Republika Srpska during the Bosnian conflict.161 In 2001, she voluntarily
surrendered to the ICTY and was charged with two counts of genocide and
complicity in genocide and six counts of crimes against humanity. 162 In
exchange for a plea of guilty to persecution (one count among the charges
for crimes against humanity), the prosecutor agreed to drop the other charges
and recommend a light sentence.163 The court approved the agreement, and
Plavšić was eventually sentenced to just eleven years in a “posh” Swedish
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prison complex. 164 Significantly, along with her guilty plea, Plavšić was
required by the ICTY Trial Chamber to provide a five-page statement in
which she detailed the circumstances of her crime of persecution.165 The
prosecution and defense teams agreed that Plavšić’s statement would quell
revisionist accounts of the crime, aiding the Trial Chamber’s truth-finding
function.166 Both sides also defended the plea bargain by noting that a trial
would be followed by debate about the accuracy and quality of evidence
presented, but debate is minimal when the defendant details the
circumstances of the crime.167
Beyond the statement requirement, other procedural rules of
international criminal tribunals also tailor plea bargaining to suit the truthfinding function of the tribunals. For example, the ICC’s Rules of Procedure
and Evidence provide that the court may order a “more complete
presentation of the alleged facts” if it believes that the “interests of justice
require it.”168 This language is broad enough to give the court discretion to
reject a plea bargain if it believes that the record indicates that the defendant
is actually innocent or that the crime is one for which a full trial is necessary
to build an accurate historical record. Article 65 of the statute creating the
ICC also notes that the “admission of guilt [must be] supported by the facts
of the case.”169 This case-by-case approach to plea bargaining allows the
international courts to reconcile the practice with its duty to discover the
truth. Japan can adapt institutionalized plea bargaining to the truth-seeking
goal of its justice system by adopting similar methods: requiring defendants
to make detailed statements accompanying their guilty pleas and adopting
procedural rules that grant the court discretion in determining whether to
approve a plea agreement.
B.

Self-Condemnatory Plea Bargaining Mechanisms Will Promote
Defendants’ Remorse and Rehabilitation

Given the serious nature of the crimes that come before them,
international criminal tribunals have had to reconcile plea bargaining with
the goals of encouraging remorseful behavior from the defendant and
promoting the defendant’s rehabilitation, objectives that the Japanese value
164
165
166
167
168
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very much.170 As with the truth seeking objective, international tribunals
have utilized plea bargaining in ways that respect the goals of remorse and
rehabilitation, and Japan can learn from this example.
The ICTY Trial Chamber has adopted a practice that one scholar calls
“negotiated self-condemnation” to advance the goals of remorse and
rehabilitation.171 Under this practice, the Trial Chamber judge pauses after
reading aloud each charge that the prosecutor is pursuing and asks the
defendant if the charge is correct; the defendant must acknowledge the
accuracy of each charge to move forward with the plea agreement.172 The
ICTY judges also encourage the defendant to apologize profusely in the
statement accompanying the guilty plea. 173 These self-condemnatory
mechanisms rest on the defendant’s acknowledgment of past mistakes and
thus can be viewed as a court-led expression of remorse and a step towards
rehabilitation.
Remorse and rehabilitation also enter more informally into the Trial
Chamber’s calculus when it decides whether to approve or reject a plea
agreement.174 In Plavšić, for example, the Trial Chamber made it clear that
it approved the plea bargain in part because the defendant contributed to
reestablishing peace and order in the very communities in Bosnia that she
had ravaged during her reign as president.175 In other words, signs of the
defendant’s remorse and rehabilitation made Plavšić an appropriate case for
“negotiated justice” rather than “imposed justice.”176
C.

Courts Can Adopt Victim-Friendly Elements in Plea Bargaining

International criminal tribunals initially faced criticism for permitting
plea bargaining because international crimes often have hundreds or
thousands of victims who want to see the defendant brought to justice.177 In
1994, for example, ICTY judges rejected a proposal from the U.S.
government to permit plea bargaining as a way of obtaining testimony from
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defendants about higher-level suspects.178 Judge Cassese, the former ICTY
President, said for the court,
[W]e always have to keep in mind that this Tribunal is not a
municipal criminal court but one that is charged with the task of
trying persons accused of the gravest possible of all crimes.
The persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide,
torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution
and other inhumane acts. After due reflection, we have decided
that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes such
as these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise
be.179
Despite this initially clear rejection of plea bargaining, the ICTY reversed
course seven years later when Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald of the United
States replaced Judge Cassese of Italy as president of the tribunal.180
The transition to plea bargaining at the ICTY was marked by a new
understanding of plea bargaining as a method of helping victims of serious
crimes and members of communities where the crimes occurred.181 Thus, in
Plavsić, the defense and prosecution agreed that the defendant’s guilty plea
represented “a significant effort toward the advancement of
reconciliation.”182 In her statement, Plavšić spoke directly to the victims of
her crime: “[My guilty plea] will, I hope, help the Muslim, Croat, and even
Serb innocent victims not to be overtaken with bitterness . . . .”183
The Plavšić case can be instructive for Japan because it suggests that
institutionalized plea bargaining is not necessarily antithetical to a justice
system that focuses on victims’ concerns. Quite the opposite, plea
bargaining can actually further the interests of victims. Since the defendant
admits to certain charges when accepting a plea bargain, the plea can
facilitate the processes of bringing together conflict-ridden communities and
moving past the crime. 184 It also spares the victim the emotional pain,
danger, or embarrassment of having to publicly recount the circumstances of
a crime by testifying at trial.185
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Japan can also emulate international tribunals by adopting a system of
plea bargaining that contains victim-friendly procedural elements. For
example, ICTY procedural rules prohibit equivocal plea bargains, in which
the defendant pleads guilty but supplements the plea with a legal defense of
his actions.186 That is, the defendant must make a clear choice to provide the
victim with closure in one of two ways: either proceed with trial or fully
admit guilt with respect to a particular charge. The ICC’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence require the court to notify victims of a prosecutor’s
decision not to prosecute the defendant for certain charges.187 Victims must
have an opportunity to respond to such prosecutorial decisions and to
otherwise participate in the court proceedings.188 The court has discretion to
obtain victims’ views on “any issue,”189 which is broad enough to cover the
court’s decision to approve or reject a proposed plea bargain. Finally, the
ICC is specifically authorized to order a “more complete presentation of the
alleged facts” if it believes that doing so is necessary to advance the victims’
interests.190 This means that the court can proceed to a full trial to protect
victims in appropriate cases. By incorporating these kinds of provisions into
its own plea bargaining system, Japan can ensure that victims play a role in
evaluating the fairness of plea bargains.
V.

CONCLUSION

The mantra of those who support the practice of plea bargaining is
simplicity, simplicity, simplicity. 191 For all its flaws, plea bargaining
simplifies the administration of criminal justice and eases burdens on court
systems. The rising crime rate in Japan, the shortage of prosecutorial
resources, and the public’s loss of confidence in prosecuting authorities
demonstrate the need for simplicity in Japan’s criminal justice system.
Tacit bargaining is a poor solution to the goal of simplicity. Because
tacit bargains are nonnegotiable and rely on a defendant’s confession, they
reinforce weaknesses of the Japanese justice system, particularly the
coercive pretrial interrogation environment and restrictions on a defendant’s
access to counsel. More generally, tacit bargains exploit the deferential
culture among Japanese defense attorneys. In addition, tacit bargains are
186
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nonbinding, leaving the defendant without a remedy if the court rejects the
prosecutor’s recommendation of leniency or the prosecutor breaches the
agreement.
Formal plea bargaining succeeds where tacit bargaining fails by
equalizing power between the defense and prosecution. Because plea
bargaining involves the full scope of negotiation, it invites active
participation from defense counsel. Moreover, the defendant can withdraw
his guilty plea if the court rejects the plea agreement and can seek
enforcement of the agreement if the prosecutor breaches. Because of these
features of institutionalized plea bargaining, the adoption of such a system in
Japan would help make the nation’s justice system friendlier to the
procedural rights of defendants.
Finally, a look at the systematic use of plea bargaining in international
criminal tribunals addresses culturally-based criticisms of the practice in
Japan. International criminal tribunals, primarily through procedural rules
on the implementation of plea bargaining, have used plea bargaining in ways
that are sensitive to the goals of the Japanese justice system. Japan could
benefit from this example. The Japanese legal community should be more
pragmatic about the need for simplified criminal justice procedures and
adopt a system of institutionalized plea bargaining.

